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Abstract:
A basic challenge of contemporary thought is to better understand the
origin, persistence, and future course of international/ comparative law. I
suggest that a foundational step is to begin treating the law as a
philosophical matter. I propose that comparative and international legal
theory require a distinct methodology that is as integrated and systematic
as positivism, but which better recognizes the dialectic interdependence
of normative and empirical and the metaphysical interdependence of
theory and practice. Philosophical Method, as systematized by R.G.
Collingwood, promotes the dialectic over the eristic, looks for overlap
rather than definitive scientific classification, argues for comprehensive
philosophy rather than isolated theory and recognizes a proper logical
metaphysics of absolute and relative presuppositions rather than a
positive legal practice isolated from its inherent philosophical
determinants.

I.

THE ‘STATE OF THE ART’
1

This proposal is written in reaction to discussion in a seminar on the
current state of international and comparative legal theory, which took place on
July 12, 2008 at the 25th anniversary celebration for the Lauterpacht Center at
Cambridge University. This session suggested to me that many of the concerns
raised at the gathering by theorists and practitioners might be addressed more
comprehensively by an integrated and systematic competitive methodology
acting as an alternative to the core positivism that determines the major variants
of current international thinking. I offer this proposal in order to begin a
discussion of whether Philosophical Method, as herein described, might ‘fill this
bill.’
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Questions of legal governance are transcending state and
inter-state systems and becoming global. Legal practice is no
longer adequately defined by a strict norm of state sovereignty and
the process of ‘peaceful’ international cooperation, but must justify
norms, rules, and principles with various levels of definition and
interdependence both within and outside a primary focus on the
‘Westphalian’ state structure. There is also the evolution of new
organizations, courts, and tribunals to consider. The international
jurisprudence that these novel international governance systems
are creating must be understood in all its complexity, as well as the
fundamental concern for the dialectic interaction between these
institutions and the ideas that they create and that create them.
International and comparative law need to respond to this growing
complexity through the recognition that the current focus on valid
practice, as the primary foundation of both empirical and
normative analysis, must be transcended. Such a response is
necessary because the most challenging questions of global
governance, those connected with, for example, globalization, the
transmutation of sovereignty, the international rights of the
individual, or the intervention of one state in the affairs of another,
are fundamentally ‘philosophical’ rather than technical or scientific
questions, and have a distinct ontology requiring a specific method
and epistemological assumptions that transcend the narrowly
positivist predispositions of contemporary transnational law.
If we have more international human rights than are
currently recognized in global legal practice, we need to be able to
recognize a potential legal right, and how it gains legal status. If
globalization is more than an economic phenomenon and should
integrate human rights or environmental protection, then reciprocal
trade may not be a proper vehicle for the constitutionalization of
the international system. But, if it is not, then we need agreedupon standards to make judgments and recognize a better
governance alternative. If sovereignty is a principled end-in-itself,
to be preserved as essential to the international system, then we
need to be ready to sacrifice other ends to its power in the law of
international practice. However, if sovereignty is a process-norm
or means to other ends that can be sacrificed for a more persuasive
legal organizing principle, without destroying the inherent stability
of the international legal system, then we need a way to first tell
the difference between principle and process as two normative
categories in order to understand how these types of norms
interact.
For example, only with a higher level of normative
complexity than presently exists will we be able to effectively
decipher and synthesize a fuller understanding of the relationship
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of sovereignty, intervention, and self-determination. Overall, we
need a new way to organize ideas in order to reasonably argue as
to whether moral principles should continue to be lead by practice
or transcend practice in the international and comparative law of
the 21st century.
With Matti Koskenniemi, we can no longer afford to
assume “that the problems of theory are non-problems and that the
sociological and normative issues of world order can best be
treated by closely sticking to one’s doctrinal task of analyzing
valid law.” 2 Instead, in order to argue for a proposed global legal
right, we will need to understand the dialectically related concepts
inherent in its connection to morality, politics, and foundational
agency or ‘humanity in the person.’ To justify a consistent policy
argument for intervention that does not ebb and flow with practice
but anticipates it, we will need to set legal standards and justify
them within a deeper system of anticipatory metaphysical
presuppositions than is allowed by the superficial and strictly
retrospective focus of legal positivism. To assess why
globalization is proceeding for the international economy but
lagging behind in terms of human rights or the protection of the
natural world, we need to understand concepts such as ‘free trade’,
‘human dignity’ and ‘sustainability’ through the many overlapping
categories of interdependent classification that define their
philosophical genus and are necessary for a complete sense of their
joint and individual characters.
International and comparative law is swiftly becoming an
interdependent system of concepts and contexts with overlapping
philosophical complexity beyond the understanding provided to us
by a focus on validity, scientific observation, and the inductive
extrapolation of legal practice alone. For example, rather than
assuming that all legal standards can be classified as ‘norms’ and
instantiated by practice, we may need to have a more detailed
taxonomy of normative concepts for international and comparative
law that distinguishes moral principles from legal principles from
norms from rules. A more complex philosophical structure is able
to justify a number of logical routes by which these distinct yet
interdependent normative standards are made operational within
legal practice as well as decipher what distinct roles they play in
the translation of human values into valid law. 3
If human will and moral principle are to lead legal practice,
we may need to have more well integrated and morally persuasive
arguments that can decipher and then describe the fundamental
2

MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA 2-3 (2006).
See John Martin Gillroy, Adjudication Norms, Dispute Settlement Regimes
and International Tribunals: The Status of “Environmental Sustainability” in
International Jurisprudence, 42 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2006).
3
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presuppositions of our current international legal system while
suggesting a range of possibilities for the future of governance
under the rule of law. Perhaps our task should be not simply to ask
what international law ‘is’ or what it ‘should be’ but to seek an
understanding of the dialectic dynamic between its inherent ideas,
merging theory) 4 practice, ideas) institutions, and justice)order
now within an historical context, and in anticipation of future
evolution.
However, the standard point of departure for legal study is
the validity of its practice. The literature of both international and
comparative legal theory traditionally infers norms from practice.
The emphasis is on the positive nature of the law and its rules,
processes, and institutions. There is an inherent assumption that
this empirical analysis can be examined independently, free of any
strictly moral or prior normative considerations which constitute a
separate category of dialectically unrelated scholarship. This
latter, separate category of normative argument has emerged,
however, from within the same post-positivist milieu as its
empirically-driven counterpart. Although many normative
theorists have made headway in understanding the true complexity
of the international legal system, they have largely accepted the
proposition that practice is the starting point for legal study and
that the normative and empirical dimensions of the rule of law
should be considered distinct dichotomous realms of scientifically
classified thought and analysis. 5
Specifically, modern international legal argument is
dominated by positivist predispositions that undergird most of the
4

I will use this symbol to indicate a dialectic relation between ideas. Here,
dialectic is defined not just in the formal Hegelian sense but also in the general
sense that no philosophical concept has its essence in itself alone, but in the
tension (represented by the small vertical lines) between itself and its other
(represented by the arrows in opposition).
5
My point here is that the core of what is wrong with each type of current
international and comparative legal theories is that they deny dialectic and begin
with an assumption of the priority of practice. This includes all those that call
their work normative and those who identify themselves as empirical. For
example, Terry Nardin, creates a moral argument that begins and ends with legal
practice. SeeTERRY NARDIN, LAW, MORALITY, AND THE RELATIONS OF STATES
(1983). Alexander Wendt, protesting that he was only engaged in empirical
theory, suggested three distinct constructivist models for international practice
that he called Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian but which have no direct
connection with any of these philosophers’ writings and still employ a positivist
method. See ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS (1999). Allen Buchanan examines ‘moral foundations’ that also begin
with legal practice but are built upon the un-argued assertion that justice should
be based on human rights, which Philosophical Method tells us is incorrectly
treating a relative presupposition as absolute. See ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE
LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004).
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theoretical schools of ‘international legal theory’ to the detriment
of a more comprehensive philosophical understanding of the
foundations and dynamics of global legal practice. To date, we
have settled for either the non-philosophical examination of
validity located in empirical legal practice alone, or for noncomprehensive and non-dialectic normative arguments that begin
with law as practice rather than recognize it as a product of the
dynamics of philosophical ideas, legal institutions, and social
reality. Given the current literature, one must ask if we are capable
of transcending the assumptive structure of positivism that we
learned as students of the law and which has substantially created
the intellectual world in which we all live. If the dynamic between
our physical surroundings and their metaphysical foundations must
be studied as an interconnected whole for a true understanding of
the evolving international rule of law to emerge, then we need to
approach this study with the proper ontological, epistemological,
and methodological standards, which, I maintain, we are not now
doing. We need to see beyond the surface validity of the law and
the false dichotomy of normative and positive to find the dynamic
or dialectic core of the international legal system. Only then can
we overcome our positivist prejudices and take a fresh look at the
origins, persistence, and future of international law.
II.

SETTING THE TASK BEFORE US

To enhance the study of legal process and integrate the
realities of international and comparative law as a philosophical
subject of analysis, we need to be able to overcome five specific
tendencies of contemporary legal analysis, which represent the
core prejudices of an overly simplistic definition of practice. 6
First, our approach to international law should not be satisfied with
theory replacing philosophy. Since the positivist revolution of the
mid-nineteenth century, we all have been trained in distinct
disciplines to pursue theory adequate only to explaining one’s
particular corner of the socio-political or legal landscape. Unlike
our predecessors in the 17th and 18th century, we no longer seek a
comprehensive philosophical understanding of how the human
social milieu came into being, how it shapes and is shaped by the
individual humans within it, and how and why it renders, in
particular circumstances, particular institutional and legal
structures for its persistence over time. We no longer see our part
6

This analysis seeks to apply, with enhancements, the works of R.G.
Collingwood. See generally R.G. COLLINGWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PHILOSOPHICAL
METHOD (1933) [hereinafter EPM]; R.G. COLLINGWOOD, AN ESSAY ON
METAPHYSICS (2002) (1940) [hereinafter EM]; R.G. COLLINGWOOD, THE NEW
LEVIATHAN (2005) [hereinafter NL].
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of the theoretical whole within its greater philosophical context
and as an application of greater socio-legal forces to specific cases
and controversies.
When philosophical material is utilized within this isolated
theoretical exercise, as it sometimes is, it does not involve a
comprehensive understanding of any philosopher’s greater
integrated system, but the use of bits and pieces of their exegesis.
These disembodied components are then applied in isolation from
one another to make specific contextual points within the modern
theorist’s argument. This practice is fostered by positivism, which
discounts integrated philosophical systems and seeks only
components of those systems that aid in the understanding of
specific empirical or normative questions. But is it our seeming
satisfaction with these ‘theoretical’ corners or isolated components
of the greater philosophical space that retards our analytic progress
in understanding contemporary international law?
Second, we have moved away from the ancient assumption
that the core of legal argument is dialectic to one that scholarly
discourse is essentially eristic with ideological confrontation over
normative matters being the rule rather than the exception. We no
longer start from the assumption that “[i]n a dialectical discussion
you aim at showing that your own view is one with which your
opponent really agrees, even if at one time he denied it; or
conversely that it was yourself and not your opponent who began
by denying a view with which you really agree . . . . The essence
of dialectical discussion is to discuss in the hope of finding that
both parties to the discussion are right, and that this discovery puts
an end to the debate.” 7
As the core of positivist political and legal scholarship,
eristic argument begins with one component of a dichotomized
pair, for example, empirical without normative, and demands
separate scholarships for each. Eristic positivism demands that an
idea be adequately assessed without benefit of its dialectic counterarguments. Instead of assuming that normative)positive,
process)principle, or order)justice are integrated dialectic pairs
where one component cannot be assessed in the absence of the
other, and instead of seeking a synthesis solution where principles
are refined within the dialectic itself through interactive political
and legal debate, we assume that discourse and argument are about
forming and dichotomizing distinct points of view where the value
of any position is its internal purity alone.
As purveyors of eristic legal debate in the study of practice
we no longer seek agreement where none exists, but the victory of
one point of view or principle over the other. Instead of
associating an argument’s integrity with the active interaction of
7

NL, supra note 6, at 181-82.
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concepts and agreements through synthesis, in eristic discourse we
define a policy’s integrity from, and also within, each distinct side
of the issue. Eristic argument discourages debate and abhors
synthesis because any movement from strictly interpreted and
defined principle within one detachable side of the argument is
defeat for that side, ceding victory to the other.
Third, eristic positivist methods have given us a primarily
retrospective legal analysis that focuses on the objective of
scientific discovery but not the refinement and justification of the
law as a set of philosophical ideas. Instead of a ‘science’ of law,
where the point of scholarship is the discovery of valid practice,
we should be focused on philosophical method applied to law
beginning with concepts already known to us at some level of
sophistication and seek, through dialectic analysis, the refinement
of our understanding of them and their inherent complexity as
applied ideas.
Our search should be for comprehensive philosophical
paradigms as a starting point in an effort to seek the “generic
essence” of any specific legal concept. Instead of a concentration
on the observable surface, the search should be for that “essence”
indigenous to the idea itself and revealed through progressive
philosophical analysis. Legal theory, as analyzed from the
scientific perspective, is generally considered to be about the
discovery of valid practice, which is a fit subject of study in and of
itself, being positive and based upon observation and induction.
This superficial definition of practice, and even the norms that
regulate it, are considered to be the product of positive action and
choice, separable from foundational philosophical considerations,
and revealed by the examination of empirical phenomena alone.
Rather than refinement toward philosophical essence, the
‘discovery’ of valid practice is, from this perspective, the true
expression of the application of reason to the world, unlike
normative concerns prior to practice which, if they exist at all, are
assumed to contribute only to an environment of opinion and
ideology rather than argument and truth.
The search for generic essence, the refinement process, is
made accessible by the fourth characteristic of philosophical legal
argument. Unlike scientific concepts that can be definitively
classified, for example, by their genus and species, philosophical
concepts overlap and create a scale of forms with their dialectic
interaction and synthesis. A genus within scientific method
contains distinct species, which is its purpose. These species
classifications sort, separate, and effectively allow the scientist to
study each one independently. Within philosophical method, a
macro-concept like sovereignty may be considered a ‘genus’ from
the standpoint of philosophical method, but its inherent ideas, or
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species, like ‘self-determination’ or ‘effective control’, are not
philosophically independent of one another, nor can they be
studied separately.
Because the ‘species’ of a philosophical ‘genus’ have no
single definitive classification, they are improperly studied as
scientific or positive concepts alone. 8 The idea of the overlap of
categories into which a single philosophical concept
simultaneously fits frustrates the scientific classification of social,
political, and legal ideas into one and only one of those
observational classifications. Further, a philosophical concept
cannot be definitively defined by its empirical surface alone but
must be understood in terms of both what can be observed and the
ideas that are below the surface but which define and justify the
concept. Approaching international law through philosophical
method is a multi-faceted effort and needs more than observation
and induction of any single facet of, for example, the concept of
justice. In addition to a study of justice-in-practice, attention needs
to be paid to the dialectical relations of theory and practice as well
as to the various overlapping and dialectically interdependent
‘species’ of, for example, justice-as-allocation, justice-as-order,
justice-as-dessert and justice-as-distribution. In addition, outside
its genus one may also need to consider the many material and
metaphysical ideas that share the same legal argument or policy
design space 9 with justice, as, for example, do the ideas of
obligation, wealth, respect, and human agency.
With the overlap of categories, philosophical method
replaces the objective of empirical discovery with the imperative
of philosophical refinement toward specificity of essence. The
progress of the legal concept along this scale of forms toward its
essence, involves all of those variables that contribute to its
essence including its dialectic and overlapping relations. The scale
of more and more sophisticated definitions of a concept cannot be
understood, and its essence is essentially denied if the
philosophical concept is treated as a strictly positive one that can
be uniquely classified and studied in the absence of dialectic. If
we approach even the idea of ‘practice’ as if it has no dialectic
with principle and does not exhibit overlap and a scale of forms
toward deciphering its essence, then human understanding of
practice itself becomes impossible. In the same way, to seek the
refinement and justification of the generic essence of the
international rule of law requires more than treating the law as a
8

EPM, supra note 6, at 41-42.
See generally JOHN MARTIN GILLROY, BREENA HOLLAND & CELIA
CAMPBELL-MOHN, A PRIMER FOR LAW & POLICY DESIGN: UNDERSTANDING
THE USE OF PRINCIPLE & ARGUMENT IN ENVIRONMENT & NATURAL RESOURCE
LAW (2008).
9
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valid, isolated, and static concept, which is what positivism
prescribes. “The result of this identification [of essence] is that
every form, so far as it is low in the scale, is to that extent an
imperfect or inadequate specification of the generic essence, which
is realized with progressive adequacy as the scale is ascended.” 10
Legal concepts, in this way, should be assumed to form an
escalator of conceptual refinement as they move closer to their
generic essence through philosophical argument and dialectic
synthesis. This linkage between distinct levels of overlapping
complexity creates a ‘scale of forms’ for that concept,
. . . [F]or if the species of a philosophical genus
overlap, the distinction between the known and
the unknown, which in a non-philosophical
subject-matter involves a difference between two
mutually exclusive classes of truths, in a
philosophical subject-matter implies that we may
both know and not know the same thing; a
paradox which disappears in the light of the
notion of a scale of forms of knowledge, where
coming to know means coming to know in a
different and better way. 11
Specifically, with the assumption of a scale of forms for the
world of legal ideas, analysis as part of synthesis can use
philosophical method to create ever deeper definitions of a
concept’s nature as persuasive products of dialectic argument. In
effect, this will move any concept to ever higher levels of
complexity in terms of our understanding of that idea. Meanwhile,
it raises its scale of complexity and understanding on a foundation
of those presuppositions necessary to our knowledge of the
concept and its inherent essence and logic.
Lastly, in relation to the deciphering of a scale of forms for
a concept, we should acknowledge that the search for essence
creates a metaphysical dimension to the law that distinguishes
relative from absolute presuppositions. Our current world of
empirical positivism, having separated and isolated the evidence of
valid practice as the primary component of its research, analysis,
and method, has neglected the critical importance within all
systems of argument (i.e. both scientific and philosophical), of a
set of metaphysical presuppositions or assumptions upon which to
base and justify applied argument.
Specifically, on a scale of forms, a series of relative
presuppositions lead, finally, to an absolute presupposition that
10
11

EPM, supra note 6, at 61.
Id. at 161.
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defines the core ‘truth’ of the concept. The absolute
presupposition is the moral primitive of the concept, its essence, 12
and necessary to the concept’s integrity, with no further
presuppositions informing it. The scale of forms, built into a
metaphysical logic, while not necessary to scientific discovery, is
critical to philosophical justification. Seeking an ever greater
depth for legal concepts responds to the needs of a progressively
more complex and sophisticated system of interlocking
ideas)institutions to be analyzed and produces a much more
complex definition of legal practice. This depth toward generic
essence is also necessary to make legal ideas more reasonable or
persuasive in contemporary jurisprudence and policy argument as
the international rule of law gains needed complexity in a
globalizing world.
Within positivism, a metaphysics of absolute and relative
presuppositions is replaced by layers of equally relative
presuppositions, all assumed to be true without argument or
analysis. 13 This, in fact, confuses the role of absolute and relative
presuppositions and ignores their philosophical character,
metaphysical interrelations, and dynamic dialectic evolution along
the scale of forms necessary to legal ideas. When a policy
argument, for example, assumes all its presuppositions to be
relative, it is not assuming a dynamic dialectic connection between
them, but a circular logic, as each relative presupposition is an
‘answer’ to one level of questions, while, as a presupposition, it
poses questions for the next level of similarly relative
presuppositions. By assuming that all of these relative
presuppositions are true without analysis, the purpose of any
inherent metaphysical scale of forms is defeated, for it is
impossible to create a logical scale of forms for the intellectual
refinement of a concept without being able to sort and justify
connections between its inherent presuppositions. It is also the
case that without a single common and fundamental foundation as
a point of departure for the repeated dialectical progression
between theory and practice toward essential refinement, practice
remains superficial and correspondingly less useful in an ever
more complex international legal system.
Fundamental presuppositions are, rather, singular and
foundational within the system of metaphysics for any

12

A central idea of philosophical method is in seeking conceptual essence,
even if it is never fully achieved. Although we may not ever know a concept as a
‘thing-in-itself,’ we can understand its inherent dialectical complexity, its
overlap with other concepts, and its dynamic progress toward a more and more
essential understanding of its essence.
13
EM, supra note 6, at 154, 176.
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philosophical concept, and are necessary for an adequate argument
or its application to practice.
Metaphysics is concerned with absolute
presuppositions. We do not acquire absolute
presuppositions by arguing; on the contrary,
unless we have them already arguing is
impossible to us. Nor can we change them by
arguing; unless they remained constant all our
arguments would fall to pieces. We cannot
confirm ourselves in them by ‘proving’ them; it
is proof that depends on them, not they on proof.
. . . We must accept them and hold firmly to
them; we must insist on presupposing them in all
our thinking without asking why they should be
thus accepted, [b]ut not without asking what they
are. 14
Specifically, in a world that acknowledges the
philosophical dimensions of human reason, there are both relative
and absolute presuppositions in every facet of human life. An
absolute presupposition is one that “stands, relative to all questions
to which it is related, as a presupposition, never as an answer.” 15
These exist, however, only at the most primitive and essential level
of conceptual understanding, and are fundamental components in a
greater logical-philosophical system of relative presuppositions
that are dynamic both within themselves, on the scale of forms,
and with other interrelated concepts that connect theory to practice
through dialectic linkage. These absolute presuppositions are
necessary in and of themselves to argument, discourse, and the
logical structure of the social or legal system, but can exist
untested by argument only to the extent that they are nested within
a system of relative presuppositions which are constantly so tested.
Absolute presuppositions should also be openly acknowledged by
the analyst, and tested themselves, in terms of their ability to
support a logically intact and therefore persuasive argument.
In effect, because of a reliance on a narrow definition of
empirical practice as a source of both normative and positive legal
argument, we, who study and use international law, have accepted
an underlying set of relative presuppositions related to the
observational history of the practice of, for example, sovereignty,
intervention, justice and globalization that are treated as absolute
presuppositions. This grants us neither a scale of forms with a
dynamic dialectic nor an analyzed metaphysics as an integrated
14
15

Id. at 173.
Id. at 31.
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system of logical concepts to undergird international law as it faces
new nor more demanding global challenges.
A VERY MODEST PROPOSAL

III.

To create a more vital international law for the new century
the field must be philosophically invigorated through the
enhancement of the conventional positivist influence in the five
areas just discussed, by promoting:
1. Comprehensive Philosophy over a Compartmentalized
Theory;
2. Dialectic Argument over Eristic;
3. Refinement of Ideas over the Imperative of Discovery;
4. Overlap of Concepts over their Definitive Classification;
5. An Essential Metaphysics of Absolute and Relative
Presuppositions over a Primary Dependence on Surface
Validity.

However, this begs the question of whether we are capable
of thinking outside of our positive predispositions. What if the
study of ‘norms’ as dialectically related by philosophical method
has been so overtaken by a social science of superficial practice
with a core positive norm of validity that we cannot escape the idea
that the logical separation of law and morals 16 leads to the
inevitable scientific classification of these concepts as distinct and
independent ‘species?’ This is the basis for the conventional claim
that law and morals are separable concepts, where each ought to
have its own distinct body of scholarship. What if the scientific
world view is so ingrained in our predispositions toward the
analysis of concepts in our field that the primary focus of our
energies will continue to remain the positive and retrospective
analysis of practice? Are we capable of changing our essential
point of view to rediscover the fundamentals of international and
comparative law?
After all, our training comes from within this tradition and
does not routinely consider the dialectical interrelationships of the
legal and philosophical, or the metaphysical and material context
of socio-political concepts. If, in both the scholarly and practical
context, the law and its inherent policy debate are assumed to be
the product of non-philosophical, eristic arguments about practice
rather than the synthesis of principles and process evolving within
a dialectical scale of forms, how do we overcome these inherent
16

See the Hart—Fuller debate. See, e.g., H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Morals 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1957-1958); see also Lon
Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law — A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 630 (1958).
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prejudices and create a stronger definition of the law? What are
we to do if we hope to transcend our age with its epistemological
blinkers and metaphysical blinders?
We might all agree that it is too late to stop the
specialization of fields and the march of scientific method that has
created the intellectual environment in which we learn and teach,
but if our contemporary context is inhibiting the full use of
philosophical method, we may need to look back to a ‘prepositivist era’ when this was not the case, to see if its philosophical
systems can be understood as paradigms and then applied to our
current legal debates, with more essential and comprehensive
results. From the mid-seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth century,
before the positivism of Bentham and Austin gained dominance of
the legal landscape and when the intellectual world-view was
inherently one more akin to what is here defined as Philosophical
Method, assuming dialectic and the refinement of moral concepts
on a scale of forms, scholarship and its application both sought to
replace revelation with reason in matters of the physical and
philosophical universe. Perhaps by utilizing these systems of
thought, created from a set of assumptions akin to Collingwood’s
Philosophical Method, we can make better progress in completing
this objective for comparative and international law.
These thinkers operated in an atmosphere in which the task
was to create comprehensive philosophical models where context
and ideas interacted dialectically within the socio-legal landscape.
Whether classified as empiricists, like David Hume, or idealists,
like Immanuel Kant, philosophers of this era treated the human
socio-legal context as a philosophical subject, acknowledging,
even in a search for a science of human social life, an effort to
create a comprehensive and logically integrated philosophical
system. Philosophical systems created in this era were based on a
predisposition toward the dialectical relations of ideas and a search
for persuasive arguments about the absolute and relative
presuppositions that would increase our knowledge of what is
essential about an idea within its scale of forms. This was a time
when the scholar was not a lawyer, or scientist, or economist, but a
philosopher, regardless of whether they were trying to chart the
heavens, understand human nature, decode chemical reactions, find
the origin of government, or analyze theoretical mathematics.
There were few hard divisions to the academy or to one’s thought
or writing and although we may not be able to go back to this
environment, we can transplant it through the philosophical system
logically integrated within its intellectual atmosphere and still
available to us.
Consider that Thomas Hobbes in his argument for
Leviathan demonstrate Philosophical Method by beginning with

13

optical physics followed by the psychological origins of the
human will, and later moving on to describe the individual and his
social context simultaneously in terms of its material, political,
moral, and spiritual interdependence. For Hobbes, concepts like
liberty, self-preservation, and consent are simultaneously principle
and process; they are both normative and empirical and supportive
of justice and order. By assuming that we can take these predefined systems of thought, not created for application to policy or
law but effective for us toward this end, we may be able to move
past the retrospective prejudice of existing legal practice to the
integration of Philosophical Method, Pre-Positivists Paradigms,
and Policy Arguments for Legal Design, using different
philosophical paradigms to represent distinct sets of values and
their logical entailments in codified international and comparative
contexts.
Applying paradigms to specific issues in law would then be
a way, be it an indirect one, to apply pre-positivist philosophical
method to the design and construction of law and policy for the
new century. In effect, through what I will call PhilosophicalPolicy And Legal Design, 17 the philosophical systems of that era
can be combined with the modern tools of legal design from
existing practice to provide a vehicle for the contemporary
interaction of theory)practice that may provide a new
methodology, as powerful and logically consistent as positivism
that is applicable to concrete policy and law, but is more
encouraging to the full understanding of humanity and its legal
systems. Might we yet be able to transcend our ingrained and
impoverished positivist predispositions and, with a new
methodology, ascertain if we might be missing a range of essential
insights into the past, present, and complex future of the
international rule of law?

17

See GILLROY ET AL., supra note 9; see also JOHN MARTIN GILLROY,
JUSTICE & NATURE: KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND
THE LAW (2002), for my attempt to put this suggestion into action for
environmental policy. I have also applied Philosophical Method and
Philosophical-Policy to International Law in an article, John Martin Gillroy,
Justice-As-Sovereignty: David Hume and the Origins of International Law, 78
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 429 (2007), and in a book manuscript on the same subject,
tentatively entitled THE GENESIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN SOCIAL
CONVENTION: AN APPLICATION OF HUME’S PHILOSOPHICAL-POLICY TO
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
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